Reinforcing the Shaky Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire

Is the shaky truce that purported to end the latest war between Israel and Hizbollah headed for total collapse? Not necessarily. Certainly, the news from Lebanon is less than encouraging. The ceasefire deal that Israel and Lebanon signed in November 2024, and that Hizbollah also agreed to, sometimes appears to be hanging by a thread. The Lebanese government is moving apace to disarm Hizbollah in the country’s south, between the Litani River and the Israeli border, but elsewhere the Shiite party-cum-militia is holding on to its weapons in defiance of the agreement. Meanwhile, Israel continues to violate truce prohibitions on the use of force against Lebanon – occupying territory and conducting constant air raids. On 9 July, as U.S. envoy Tom Barrack wrapped up a visit to Beirut, Israel revealed that it had recently conducted several ground raids in Lebanon – another egregious violation of the truce.
Yet it would be premature to write off the November 2024 agreement as a dead letter. Even after decrying the deal as a failure, Barrack gave it a new lease on life during his early July stop in Lebanon. By welcoming a Lebanese government proposal to negotiate with Hizbollah to achieve its disarmament, rather than trying to force the group into submission, he created space for a workable truce implementation plan. Turning that possibility into a reality will be no mean feat, but if the U.S. stays engaged and wields influence over the parties, the ceasefire could work out after all.

In November 2024, Lebanon and Israel agreed to a ceasefire after more than a year of devastating war between Israel and Hizbollah, which took an especially heavy toll on Lebanon. The agreement stipulated that the sides would stop trading fire across the border. It said Lebanon would get rid of all unauthorised military assets in the country, whether belonging to Hizbollah or to any other non-state actor – starting in the area south of the Litani (which runs at a 5 to 30km distance from the Israeli border). It also required Israel to withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon within 60 days, allowing the Lebanese army to deploy there. 

These terms largely reflect those of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended Hizbollah’s last major confrontation with Israel in 2006. In an innovation, the deal created a “monitoring mechanism” chaired by a U.S. general and comprising representatives of Lebanon, Israel, France and the UN. Hizbollah did not sign the truce agreement, but it approved the terms, some of which it has since come to dispute.

Seven months on, the ceasefire has reduced hostilities but far from ended them. Indeed, many of its provisions are persistently honoured in the breach. Although its attacks are much reduced since the height of the conflict, Israel has continued to launch near-daily air raids, mostly on targets in southern Lebanon, but also farther north, including sporadic strikes in the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs. Referring to the ceasefire deal’s provision that both countries have the “inherent right to self-defence”, it claims that these strikes are disrupting Hizbollah’s attempts to re-establish its military presence in violation of the truce. In April, the UN reported that Israel’s attacks had killed over 70 civilians since the ceasefire. The latter’s raids have prevented many Lebanese from going home to rebuild villages bombed during the war, while thousands of Israelis remain displaced on the other side of the border as well. 

The Israeli army also continues to occupy several “strategic” points of Lebanese territory along the frontier. Israel justifies this ceasefire violation as necessary for protecting its citizens until it is satisfied that the Lebanese army has asserted full control of the south. The occupation has stirred widespread rancour in Lebanon, given Israel’s previous invasions of the country, and the two nations’ failure to demarcate their shared land border. 

For its part, Hizbollah has implemented the deal in some places, but not in others. It has cooperated with the Lebanese authorities’ efforts to disarm the group south of the Litani. It has also largely pursued a policy of non-confrontation with Israel, claiming responsibility for only one attack on northern Israel since November 2024. (That attack took place several days into the ceasefire and reportedly caused no damage.) The group denied involvement in two cross-border rocket launches in March, which the Lebanese army pinned on rogue Hamas operatives. International observers accept that the group has largely complied with the truce’s provisions for disarmament in the south. So, too, do most Lebanese. A politician stridently opposed to Hizbollah told Crisis Group that he is “happy” with the progress in this regard. Even some Israeli officials have suggested they are pleasantly surprised by the disarmament in the borderlands.

On the other hand, Hizbollah has declined to surrender its weapons caches in the rest of the country. The group and its allies contend that comprehensive disarmament is a matter for Lebanese, not for outsiders, to resolve through dialogue between Hizbollah and the country’s other political and military leaders. To support its interpretation that these matters lie outside the purview of the ceasefire deal, Hizbollah invokes the agreement’s requirements concerning Israel’s troop withdrawal and the Lebanese army’s deployment, which refer specifically to the “southern Litani area”, suggesting that this phrase creates a limit on the disarmament requirements that apply to it. As Hizbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem reiterated the day before U.S. envoy Barrack’s trip to Beirut on 7 July, the group refuses even to contemplate talks about disarming throughout Lebanon until Israel upholds its end of the bargain – to wit, by halting its attacks and withdrawing from all the Lebanese territory that it still occupies. (As noted, Israel insists that these attacks are justified by Hizbollah’s own truce violations.)

For their part, Lebanon’s new political leaders, elected early in the year, have repeatedly vowed to disarm all non-state actors – but without throwing caution to the wind. Upon taking office, President Joseph Aoun asserted that he would work to enforce a Lebanese state monopoly over military-grade weapons. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam made the same commitment in his newly appointed cabinet’s ministerial statement, which parliament voted to endorse. But overall implementation has been slow, because Lebanon’s leadership prefers to work via compromise and negotiation rather than trying forcibly to wrest weapons from the groups’ hands. Aoun has personally led direct negotiations with Hizbollah about the group’s military wing, saying it is necessary to build a genuine domestic consensus about sensitive issues like its disarmament to avoid “igniting a civil war”. 

Aoun’s cautious approach reflects fears that Hizbollah – though severely weakened during the war and by Israel’s continued attacks since then – could still wreak havoc in Lebanon if cornered over its military wing. But this anxiety is not universally shared. Most of Hizbollah’s staunch domestic opponents dismiss Aoun’s concerns, arguing that the group’s once formidable fighting force has become a paper tiger. During the war, Israel killed Hizbollah’s top leaders and many senior cadres; it destroyed much of the group’s arsenal of missiles and rockets as well. In December 2024, the group’s long-time ally Bashar al-Assad fell, cutting off its overland supply line via Syria from its patron, Iran. Tehran has reportedly tried to provide help by other avenues, including through the Beirut airport, but the Lebanese state has worked to close these channels as well. Hizbollah’s critics accordingly see little danger to Lebanon if the state were to force the group to disarm. Yet neither Aoun nor Salam seems inclined to take this gamble. Many centrist Lebanese politicians agree: one such parliamentarian told Crisis Group that a direct confrontation over arms would be a “recipe for problems”.

As frustration with partial compliance has mounted on both sides of the border, the U.S. has become increasingly involved in trying to hold the truce together. In mid-June, the Trump administration signalled that time for taking serious action on Hizbollah’s disarmament was running out fast. On a visit to Beirut that month, Barrack presented a position paper that reportedly exhorted the Lebanese government to draw up a concrete timetable for Hizbollah’s complete disarmament within months. The paper (which has not been publicly disclosed) apparently indicated that should Beirut deliver on that commitment, the U.S. would push Israel to withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon and end its military operations. 

Before Barrack’s return in early July, diplomatic pressure escalated to a point where the position paper started appearing less like an offer and more like an ultimatum. Saudi Arabia’s deputy foreign minister warned, for instance, that Lebanon needed to seize the opportunity or face renewed war. A Lebanese parliamentarian who sits on the foreign relations committee confirmed to Crisis Group that the country’s leaders received unambiguous threats to this effect from various foreign officials. Israel conducted several air raids on the eve of Barrack’s return, mostly north of the Litani. After Qassem’s defiant speech earlier that day, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said the Hizbollah leader clearly had “not learned the lesson from [Hassan] Nasrallah’s fate”, referring to Qassem’s predecessor, whom Israel assassinated in September 2024. 

Despite the tense build-up, Barrack struck a conciliatory tone upon receiving Lebanon’s official response to his proposal during his early July visit. Lebanon reportedly reaffirmed that it would assert a state monopoly over military-grade weapons, but added that it prefers not to set hard-and-fast deadlines for now. Rather than rebuking Beirut for moving too slowly, Barrack offered praise. After meeting with Aoun, he declared himself “unbelievably satisfied” with Beirut’s reply, which he called “thoughtful” and “considered”. 

Barrack also made some important substantive points. In what appeared to be a significant addendum to his mid-June proposal, he said the U.S. would not impose a timetable for Hizbollah’s disarmament; rather, it would allow the Lebanese government to forge “unanimity” among the country’s political factions, including the Shiite party, before it set a schedule. Remarkably, he went on to say: “Hizbollah is a political party; it also has a militant aspect to it. Hizbollah needs to see that there is a future for them, that that road is not harnessed just solely against them”. These comments broke with the longstanding U.S. approach of ostracising Hizbollah, including its political wing, as a terrorist organisation. While the Trump administration may decide to walk back Barrack’s position, that is not a foregone conclusion. It has sometimes shown willingness to upend Washington conventions – not least in Syria, where Trump has personally engaged with the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who formerly led an al-Qaeda affiliate.

Barrack’s words eased concerns, especially in Lebanon, that the U.S. would soon greenlight expanded Israeli military operations. At the same time, the U.S. envoy noted that Lebanon would need to develop its plans further, stressing that Beirut needs to seize this diplomatic opportunity – as it will not exist forever. Indeed, Barrack stirred up controversy in Lebanon shortly after leaving, as he tried to emphasise the situation’s urgency. He said Lebanon will face an “existential threat” if it fails to disarm Hizbollah, adding that it could once again become part of Bilad al-Sham – the historical term in Arabic for Greater Syria, which incorporated modern-day Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. Many Lebanese politicians – from Hizbollah to its sworn rival, the Lebanese Forces party – denounced Barrack’s comments, which recalled Lebanon’s period under Syrian occupation (with U.S. consent) after the 1975-1990 civil war. Barrack promptly responded to the backlash by stressing that he meant to highlight Syria’s impressive recent progress on key national priorities, not to threaten Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire remains fragile. It is not yet clear if Israel – which has yet to comment publicly on Beirut’s response to Barrack’s proposal – shares the U.S. envoy’s upbeat evaluation of Beirut’s plans for disarmament. On 9 July, as Barrack departed Beirut, Israel announced that it had conducted several covert ground raids on Lebanese territory, beyond the points that its troops still occupy – leaving observers to wonder if this flagrant ceasefire violation reflected a negotiating pressure tactic, more serious opposition to Barrack’s approach or something else entirely. 

Israel’s subsequent incursions notwithstanding, Barrack’s early July visit gave the ceasefire agreement, and diplomacy, a much-needed shot in the arm. By creating space for Beirut to negotiate rather than force disarmament, it has put the Lebanese government in the best position to keep faith with the terms of the truce. But if Washington wants to see its efforts bear fruit, it will have to stay engaged. Lebanon is unlikely to stabilise if the U.S. takes a hands-off approach, leaving the main protagonists to their own – contrary – devices.

There are risks in every direction, which Washington will need to manage. Beirut and Hizbollah could seize upon Barrack’s remarks as licence to indefinitely postpone the latter handing over its weapons. Lebanon’s political system moves at a glacial pace in addressing difficult questions, and perhaps no matter is as thorny as Hizbollah’s complete disarmament. The Lebanese army has been able to make relatively rapid progress in dismantling Hizbollah’s installations south of the Litani precisely because it is no longer a controversial project: the country’s political forces, including the leading Shiite parties (Hizbollah and Amal), have reached consensus on this point. 

But if Hizbollah and the Lebanese government approach the group’s nationwide disarmament in what appears to be a dilatory manner, Israel may yet again expand its airstrikes, possibly to massively destructive effect, given its military supremacy over both Hizbollah and Lebanese national forces. At that point, Washington would need to decide whether to spend the political capital to rein in its closest regional security partner – something it may be reluctant to do if it judges the pace and progress of Hizbollah’s disarmament to be insufficient.

Israel may also be unwilling to respect the ceasefire deal, even if Lebanon keeps making progress on disarmament. Already, it gives every sign of believing that Hizbollah has no intention of disarming completely, even as a result of negotiations with other Lebanese parties. Instead, it suspects that Hizbollah is buying time to rebuild its military wing outside state control, as it did after the 2006 war. Against this backdrop, many Lebanese – and not just among Hizbollah and its allies – fear that Israel will maintain its occupation and military operations on Lebanese territory. Some also muse that Israel may harbour undeclared ambitions to annex territory in southern Lebanon, as it has done in parts of Syria’s Golan Heights. A Lebanese politician who vehemently criticises Hizbollah questioned whether Israel, unless told otherwise by Washington, would withdraw completely from the south – even if Lebanon and Hizbollah were to comply fully with the ceasefire’s terms.

Whether the U.S. will use its leverage over all parties to best effect is unclear. On 7 July, Barrack argued that Washington deserves no blame for what he had previously described as the truce’s “total failure” because it provided no security guarantees for the deal. Yet, taken in isolation, that statement offers both an unduly negative assessment of the truce’s prospects and a cramped view of Washington’s role. The U.S. enjoys significant influence over both parties to the November 2024 deal. It provides vast support to the Israel and is spearheading international efforts to secure funding for Lebanon’s army and other security forces. It is also the chair of the ceasefire monitoring committee, which is meant to “monitor, verify and assist” the deal’s implementation. While there are no guarantees, it is in a position to help the ceasefire agreement succeed. 

Fortunately, the U.S. may have its own reasons for playing a more engaged role. Washington’s overriding interest in Lebanon, which is to secure the country’s stability through disarming Hizbollah and eliminating its sources of income, is linked to other objectives. A greater level of stability should give Lebanon’s political leaders more capacity to focus on economic reforms prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and improve relations with Syria – both U.S. goals. Trump administration officials have even floated potential normalisation between Lebanon and Israel – an ambitious prospect that will remain far from the negotiating table as long as the current conflict drags on.

Timing will be a challenge: while Beirut’s inclination may be to take things slow, that will raise the temperature not only with Israel, but with the U.S. as well. Barrack asserted that Trump wants to help Lebanon, and that he has the “courage”, “dedication” and “ability” to do so, before adding: “what he doesn’t have is patience”. Because Lebanese leaders have a penchant for procrastination, the U.S. should hold them to their commitment to produce a cogent strategy for disarmament that includes clear benchmarks and timetables. This diplomatic exercise, although labour-intensive, may help focus minds in Beirut on resolving this volatile issue. In turn, such a process could help allay Israeli fears that Lebanon plans to drag out disarmament talks until the matter falls off the international agenda, allowing Hizbollah to rearm yet again. In an encouraging sign, Barrack intends to return to Lebanon for further discussions before the end of July.

With a clear plan in place, the U.S. could then encourage the parties to follow through with the ceasefire deal on an action-for-action basis.After meeting with Barrack, Salam stressed that Lebanon’s suggested approach revolves around “interlinked steps between an Israeli withdrawal … and [Hizbollah’s] disarmament”. The principle of reciprocity makes sense. When Lebanon passes agreed-upon milestones on disarmament, Israel should match it by removing troops from the south in pre-defined increments. The U.S. can further support this process by giving more heft to the ceasefire monitoring mechanism that it chairs, pressing Israel to address concerns about alleged Hizbollah violations through the committee rather than by unilateral military action. Barrack even floated the prospect of a 90-day “stand-down agreement” to Lebanese media, under which Israel would pause its attacks. Such an initiative could be worked into a sequence of de-escalatory steps to further boost Lebanon and Hizbollah’s confidence that they are not the only side expected to implement the ceasefire deal. 

In addition, if Beirut is making progress on disarmament benchmarks, donors should facilitate the flow of at least some reconstruction aid to Lebanon. To date, main potential donors like the Gulf Arab countries have withheld large-scale financial assistance. They want to first see Lebanon move forward on disarming Hizbollah, as well as making IMF-mandated reforms to address the country’s crippling economic crisis. Barrack asserted that Lebanon would need to completely disarm all non-state actors, including Hizbollah, before the U.S. “would bring our valued Gulf allies with us to start funding reconstruction”. Yet this sequencing may not be the wisest course. Providing partial assistance in exchange for intermediate disarmament progress would give a much-needed lift to Lebanese communities destroyed by the war, where people have few other plausible prospects for rebuilding their homes any time soon. Left unchecked, their growing resentment could fan the flames of a return to armed resistance to Israel – be that through Hizbollah or other militant groups.

If quiet does return to the Lebanon-Israel border, it will last only if the two countries find a way to bridge key divides between them, beyond the question of Hizbollah’s disarmament. For now, it appears doubtful that Lebanon will normalise diplomatic relations with Israel any time soon, despite the expressed hopes of Trump administration officials. Many Lebanese citizens, including some who oppose Hizbollah, flatly reject the notion. Nevertheless, Israel and Lebanon can make progress in the right direction by addressing specific sources of tension – such as Israel’s detention of Lebanese prisoners it captured during the latest war and the need to demarcate the land border. These will be worthy topics to address once the November 2024 ceasefire has been more fully implemented and stability restored. For that to happen, the U.S. will need to stay involved, building on Barrack’s early July visit to Beirut to create the foundation for a durable calm.