Aleppo Escalation Puts Damascus–SDF Integration Agreement under Further Strain

On 6 January fighting erupted between Syrian government forces and the police forces of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, known as the Asayish units, in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah neighbourhoods. The violence has since displaced over 140,000 people and killed at least 22, including civilians. The army declared both areas “closed military zones” on 7 January. On 9 January, following U.S.-mediated negotiations, the Defence Ministry announced a ceasefire and offered the Kurdish units safe passage to the north east. Government forces subsequently entered Ashrafiyah. But the local Kurdish councils rejected the terms as “a call to surrender”, vowing to defend their neighbourhoods. The evacuation deadline has since expired and fighting resumed. This escalation casts further doubt on the unimplemented framework for integrating SDF institutions into the Syrian state memorialised in a 10 March 2025 agreement.

The embattled Kurdish-controlled enclaves inside Syria’s second-largest city are isolated pockets that Damascus likely views as challenges to its authority in territory it otherwise controls. Sheikh Maqsoud sits on elevated terrain overlooking the strategic Castello Road, Aleppo’s key northern artery, amid dense urban housing that Kurdish-led defenders have fortified since 2012. Government forces possess far greater firepower, but the Asayish are deeply entrenched and capable of inflicting costs in terrain that negates the government’s armour advantages. That said, Sheikh Maqsoud is a besieged area lacking supply lines, and with a much bigger force at its doorstep. The question is not whether the military can take it, but how long it will take and at what cost. Damascus has attempted to manage this risk through evacuation calls and humanitarian corridors – measures that can mitigate civilian casualties during standoff operations but cannot prevent them if ground forces push further into the dense interior.

The Aleppo escalation carries broader risks for Damascus regardless of how the current standoff resolves. A prolonged cycle of such confrontations could trigger broader localised violence along contact points in the east, like Deir Hafer, Tishreen Dam and Deir ez-Zor, where Damascus-SDF tensions simmer. The reputational risks are also significant. If the fighting escalates, international actors will wonder about Damascus’s capacity to govern Syria’s heterogeneous society. Arab tribal communities in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa are also watching closely. The more Damascus struggles to resolve disputes with a few hundred Asayish fighters, the more they will wonder how it can prevail against the SDF across the north east.

A negotiated resolution in Aleppo would serve all parties’ interests and could establish a template for resolving other disputes east of the Euphrates. The contours would likely involve shared security arrangements and phased integration of the Asayish into state structures. The U.S. has helped keep a ceiling on escalation in Aleppo and elsewhere, but it needs to use its leverage to create a durable framework, not simply manage repeated crises.