Can the World Make Palestine’s Statehood Recognition Matter?

The question of Palestine took centre stage in late September as world leaders convened in New York for the UN General Assembly’s 80th session. With France and Saudi Arabia chairing a conference on the two-state solution on 22 September, nine new countries confirmed that they had formally recognised the State of Palestine. They include Andorra, Australia, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal and the United Kingdom. A tenth, Belgium, has pledged to put its recognition into effect once certain political conditions are met. The announcements mean that 156 of 193 UN member states have officially crossed the recognition threshold. 

The conference built on a series of diplomatic events organised under a Saudi-EU-led “global alliance” launched in September 2024. The objective has been to promote practical steps toward a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine, as well as to revive a political process to resolve the conflict. An earlier summit held on 28-30 July culminated in a joint statement – the New York Declaration – laying out commitments to end the Gaza war, empower the Palestinians with sovereignty, ensure both Israeli and Palestinian security, and advance Middle East integration. The French-Saudi conference was given a further boost when, on 12 September, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the New York Declaration. 

French President Emmanuel Macron and other leaders presented the momentum behind recognition as vital to preserving hopes for a “just and lasting peace” to the decades-long conflict. Yet behind the public pronouncements, the recognition statements have drawn mixed reactions from Palestinian, Israeli and other officials and experts. Many wonder whether and how this flurry of activity can help end the Gaza war, let alone breathe life into a two-state solution that more and more observers consider moribund.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) – the revolutionary group that has led the Palestinian national movement since the 1960s – has since the 1980s advocated for establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. In 1988, amid the first intifada, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat unilaterally declared independence based on these territories’ borders prior to the 1967 war. He also renounced armed struggle and recognised Israel. Scores of countries recognised a Palestinian state right away, but these actions had little practical effect. 

Most governments instead left fulfilment of the two-state promise to U.S.-brokered peace talks between the Palestinians and Israel, buoyed by the 1991 Madrid peace conference following the first Gulf war. Those talks produced the 1993-1994 Oslo accords, which created the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an interim administrative and security body in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, with the assumption that Palestinian statehood would come before long. But what followed was years of a meandering “peace process” that failed to bring about a state. Instead, the PA got stuck as a quasi-government without the attributes of sovereignty, while Israeli settlements expanded and military rule deepened in most of the land it was eventually supposed to rule – leading many Palestinians to see the PA as a “subcontractor” of Israel’s occupation.

Against this backdrop, by the 2010s, the PA decided that in parallel with negotiations and security cooperation with Israel, it would lay the diplomatic and legal groundwork for formalising Palestinian statehood in the international order – even if its physical and territorial predicates were not in place. This initiative has produced a set of diplomatic and legal results. In November 2012, the UN General Assembly accepted Palestine as a non-member observer state, enabling it to sign onto various international treaties. This step in turn paved the way for Palestine, in 2015, to accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which in 2021 commenced an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. Amid Israel’s brutal campaign in Gaza following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack, in May 2024 the General Assembly upgraded Palestine’s status to observer state, affording it more privileges, and urged the Security Council to accept its full membership. Though there is virtually no chance that the Council will do so – the United States would veto any membership bid – the French-Saudi initiative has put new wind in the statehood movement’s sails.

Israeli and U.S. officials have vehemently opposed the recognition initiative. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claims that a Palestinian state “risks creating another Iranian proxy” and would become “a launchpad to annihilate Israel”. Opposition politicians in Israel have sounded similar notes, decrying the endorsement of a Palestinian state as a “reward” to Hamas and an existential threat to the Jewish state; some claim that the statehood impetus is driven by anti-Semitism. Polls consistently show the Israeli public to be of like mind. Views range from the far right’s fierce rejection of Palestinian sovereignty of any kind to centre-left claims that, in the shadow of Hamas’s attack and its continued holding of Israeli hostages, the time is not appropriate to allow a Palestinian state. Beyond the rhetorical backlash, Israel has also taken punitive action against the PA, accelerated settlement plans in the West Bank and stepped up its new military offensive in Gaza City.

The Trump administration has amplified Israel’s objections. U.S. ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee criticised the recognising governments for opting to “join with and aid and abet [Israel’s] sworn adversaries, those who are trying to kill [Israelis]”. Secretary of State Marco Rubio dismissed the recognitions as “irrelevant” and “clumsy”, later saying they would make it harder to end the Gaza war. On 29 August, the U.S. blocked visas for President Mahmoud Abbas and other Palestinian officials ahead of the General Assembly session, save for the Palestinians’ UN mission staff. (The Assembly allowed Abbas to participate by video link.) The U.S. Congress has also threatened to enforce legislation that blocks U.S. funds from going to any UN agency that accepts Palestine as a member.

As for Israel’s European allies, stalwarts such as Germany, along with more critical states like the Netherlands and Denmark, have signalled their continued support for the two-state solution but said they will not join in recognising Palestine. Among the former Soviet bloc countries that recognised Palestine before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, some that have since grown closer to Israel – notably Hungary and the Czech Republic – have declined to lend their support to UN initiatives supporting Palestinian statehood, including the 12 September endorsement of the New York Declaration.

The recognition push represents movement in a diplomatic space that had previously been characterised by intransigence. It is a break from what until recently had been a longstanding reticence on the part of key governments, particularly U.S. allies, to advance Palestinian aspirations outside the confines of failed peace negotiations – or, more bluntly, without waiting for Israel and the U.S. to consent. The original concept note for the French-Saudi conference said the organisers were adopting a “change of paradigm”, arguing that Israelis and Palestinians “do not need to embark once again on a process of confidence-building measures that may only generate more friction”. It concluded instead that “Palestinian statehood should not be a result of peace, but rather its prerequisite”. In other words, as several leaders said at the UN conference, Palestinian independence ought to be treated as an inherent right, not a reward.

Proponents are unclear what exactly this push will achieve. But they hope that recognition by big and influential countries like France, the UK, Canada and Australia could mark a qualitative and quantitative boost for Palestine’s statehood ambitions. With the important exception of the U.S., four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council now formally recognise Palestine. So, too, do a majority of the 27 member states of the European Union, Israel’s largest trading partner and the PA’s biggest sponsor. (In 2024, Ireland, Slovenia and Spain, as well as non-EU member Norway, recognised Palestine; seven other EU states had done so earlier.)

In theory, these greater numbers could make it more likely that multilateral bodies like the EU will step up action to help the Palestinians. While the EU’s strongest levers – such as suspending its Association Agreement with Israel and applying further sanctions – require full consensus and tend to be obstructed by Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the bloc still has the ability, on a qualified majority basis, to advance a range of measures to apply pressure to Israel (such as partial trade suspensions, limiting visa-free travel, and halting research and development exchanges) and to enhance support for the Palestinians (including financial and technical assistance).

Also in theory, treating Palestine as a sovereign entity could raise expectations for governments to take stronger economic, legal and political measures to bring an end to Israel’s occupation and make Palestinian independence a tangible reality. Such measures might include pledges to comply with the ICC arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former defence minister, Yoav Gallant (and any other Israeli for whom one may be issued). They might also include pressing Israel to comply with the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in connection with South Africa’s claims that Israel has breached the Genocide Convention in Gaza, and the ICJ’s July 2024 advisory opinion on the illegality of Israeli policies in the occupied territories. Governments could be encouraged to pursue new bilateral treaties and deepen financial and other commitments to Palestine. They could also use other tools at their disposal. The UK, for example, forbids its citizens from serving in other armies if they are at war with a state that is friendly to the UK, opening Britons up to the possibility of being prosecuted for enlisting in the Israeli military.

Finally, proponents hope that the recognition wave can bring back a political horizon that has long receded from view. For years, the two-state solution, though it is the bedrock of international engagement to end the conflict, has been widely diagnosed as outdated, if not long defunct. The war in Gaza has only hardened that view. Yet no viable replacement seems likely to emerge that can address both Palestinian and Israeli national aspirations and mitigate several core sources of conflict between the two peoples. Proposals for a “one-state solution” premised on civic equality have less traction today as the two societies become more fearful of each other; alternative ideas for an Israeli-Palestinian confederation have little popular backing. Many, then, welcome any effort to protect some kind of vision for Palestinians and Israelis as their relations descend into the darkest depths in the conflict’s history.

The biggest risk is twofold. First, critics note that the positive case for recognition rests largely on aspirational benefits that the Palestinians will reap only if foreign governments show a sustained political will that has deserted them in the past. They reasonably worry that recognition will prove a distraction – drawing attention away from more concrete steps that can be taken to end the war in Gaza and aid the Palestinian people amid an existential crisis. Some speculate that the recognition wave is an intentional diversion, designed to give cover to governments wishing to be seen as doing something besides issuing words of condemnation.

These are well-grounded concerns. In many Western and Arab countries – particularly those supplying arms, continuing trade or maintaining diplomatic normalisation with Israel – political leaders are struggling to reconcile constituent outrage at the Gaza war with their own postures. Officials fret that confronting Israel risks painful reprisal from President Donald Trump’s volatile administration. For example, the U.S. president said Canada’s recognition of Palestine could affect U.S.-Canadian trade talks, though he was milder with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Some may be holding out hope that another Israeli government will replace Netanyahu’s, one that proves more amenable to political negotiations with the Palestinians and willing to roll back the present far-right coalition’s maximalist agenda. This sort of waiting game, though, misreads the state of Israeli politics today and fails to grasp the extent of the emergencies in Gaza and the West Bank. For some leaders weighing their grim options, recognition may seem the least costly course of action.

Secondly, the Netanyahu government is essentially calling the world’s bluff. At first, Israeli politicians reacted to the recognitions with shows of moral indignation, but some have since quietly acknowledged that the moves will likely mean little in practice. They are also demonstrating readiness to retaliate. On 14 August, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also serves as the West Bank’s de facto governor, announced that Israel will move forward with building 3,400 settlements in E1, an area east of Jerusalem, which would in effect bifurcate the territory. Smotrich openly said this move was intended to “bury” any prospect of a Palestinian state. Signing off on the E1 plans on 11 September, Netanyahu declared, “We are going to fulfil our promise that there will be no Palestinian state; this place belongs to us”. On 3 September, Smotrich presented a map – emblazoned with the Israeli defence ministry logo – suggesting that Israel plans to annex 82 per cent of the West Bank, including major Palestinian cities like Bethlehem. In another, comparatively minor episode, after Australia cancelled an entry visa for far-right Knesset member Simcha Rothman over his extremist views, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar responded by revoking visas for Australian diplomats in Ramallah – a reminder of Israel’s near-total control of what should be Palestine’s sovereign functions.

Moreover, Israel shows no sign of halting its offensive in the besieged Gaza Strip. It is now moving to capture Gaza City, bombing high-rise buildings and levelling entire neighbourhoods with explosives – indicating that it plans to erase the city entirely. The army aims to expel the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants to the south, to continue running aid distribution through the notorious Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, and possibly to impose an indefinite occupation of the strip with ground troops. Warnings from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, the UN-backed hunger watchdog, that famine is spreading in Gaza have been dismissed by Israeli authorities. Israeli leaders also continue to disdain the ICC’s indictments of Netanyahu and Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, South Africa’s claim before the ICJ that Israel is committing genocide, and a UN Commission of Inquiry finding that it has indeed perpetrated that crime. The government’s reading of recognition – and other international responses to its Gaza campaign – seems to be that any tangible costs being imposed are insufficient to compel a change of course.

Palestinians have mixed views about recognition. Some cautiously welcome its prospective benefits, arguing that it could bolster foreign leaders’ confidence to take more concrete actions. Others believe it will make no meaningful difference. Still others believe it is dangerous – not just for the reasons noted above, but because they see it as truncating Palestinian national demands, reducing Palestine to what they describe as a shrivelled bantustan without addressing the rights of exiled refugees (who make up over half of the Palestinian people) or the injustices of the 1948 Nakba (Arabic for “catastrophe”), the mass expulsion and dispossession that enabled Israel’s creation. Virtually all, however, seem to agree that recognition alone will do little or nothing to halt the present war, which looks set to bring about even greater horrors amid the assault on Gaza City. Nor do Palestinians believe that the show of opposition at the UN will convince Israel to engage in good-faith ceasefire talks, especially after its 9 September strike on Doha, the capital of Qatar, which targeted Hamas negotiators.

The recognition movement’s main champion remains the PA. Having staked much of its political relevance on the statehood campaign, the PA believes that the latest endorsements validate its years-long pursuit of the goal. It can argue that its mission has a degree of popular backing: polls suggest that between 4o to 60 per cent of Palestinians want their own state – a notable uptick after years of declining support, suggesting that the idea offers a sense of security at a time when many Palestinians feel under unprecedented threat. At the UN gathering, the PA reportedly managed to solicit millions of dollars in donor commitments that could see public services restored and months-delayed salaries paid to thousands of Palestinian health workers, teachers and civil servants – giving relief to a population suffering under Israel’s tightened chokehold.

But the PA has largely failed to sell others on its claims of success. To date, the principal benefits of recognition have been legal, diplomatic and procedural privileges in global forums. While these gains have value, the overall impact has been disappointing. The ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction has proven shaky, as the U.S. threatens to impose harsher sanctions on the court and as some member states, including in Europe, say they may not enforce arrest warrants for Israeli officials. 

The PA’s political alliances are also frail. Arab states, for example, long ago recognised Palestine and have given backing to the PA since the Oslo accords, most prominently with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Amid the present war, they have even drawn up a reconstruction plan for Gaza predicated on a two-state solution. Yet up till now they have put precious little material or financial weight behind their words. Those that have normalisation agreements with Israel have declined to use them as leverage to end the carnage in Gaza, beyond vague warnings, even after the 9 September attack in Doha. Faced with the choice of taking much bolder action to bring about a Palestinian state or protecting their strategic and economic relations with the U.S. and Israel, Arab capitals are still – when all is said and done – opting for the latter. 

Much as the Ramallah-based PA government is banking on international validation to ensure its survival, the spectacle of diplomatic victories abroad has failed to compensate for the hollowness of the PA’s rule at home. Its deepening authoritarianism and failure to meet socio-economic needs has emptied it of popular legitimacy. The Israeli authorities, particularly under Smotrich’s oversight, have chronically depleted the PA’s coffers by refusing to hand over tax revenues and by strangling the West Bank with military closures and hundreds of checkpoints. Some Israeli politicians are even advocating for the PA’s total dismantlement. Settler violence and brutal army incursions keep much of the West Bank on edge. Insofar as plans for Gaza’s “day after” are being discussed, Israel and the U.S. are refusing to entertain a future role for the PA in the strip.

Some Palestinians also worry that recognition may become a tool for re-engineering Palestinian politics. The New York Declaration, for example, stipulates that Hamas be disarmed and barred from governance – a message that was echoed by several leaders in their recognition announcements. Trying to counter Israeli backlash, proponents insist that advancing the two-state solution would in fact be a “blow” to Hamas. Notwithstanding their internal debates about Hamas and its future role, some Palestinians regard these positions as high-handed, an effort to impose decisions that Palestinians should make themselves. They also worry that recognition could embolden PA officials who see their strategy paying dividends to evade meaningful political reforms, whether through inter-factional reconciliation or democratic elections. Some imagine that Abbas could be waiting for Israel to crush Hamas – his Fatah party’s main rival – while hoping that Western and Arab states will secure the PA’s primacy in the “day after”.

It is unlikely that foreign capitals will be persuaded to rethink their recognition moves or to seriously consider more creative ways of addressing the conflict beyond the two-state solution. The question therefore becomes one of how best to harness the energy created by the recognition movement to positive ends. 

To this end, policymakers need to grapple with how to make statehood an effective vehicle for Palestinian rights, security and self-determination, rather than a destination in itself. For recognition to have any impact, it must be a standing commitment to action, not a one-off diplomatic gesture. World leaders should thus, upon formal recognition (or even without it), pledge to carry out specific measures that will have immediate, tangible effects. The purpose should be twofold: increasing pressure on Israel to stop its policies in the occupied territories, including the war in Gaza and the de facto annexation of the West Bank; and materially backing Palestinian institutions that can be bulwarks of self-rule and help protect their interests. 

A repertoire of possible tools can be found in UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/24, passed in September 2024. The resolution is based on the ICJ’s landmark advisory opinion in July of that year, which found Israel’s prolonged military occupation unlawful, and concluded that UN member states have certain legal duties to remedy the situation. The New York Declaration of 29 July, endorsed by the General Assembly on 10 September, offers further measures centred on rehabilitating and bolstering Palestinian governing institutions. Taking their cue from the declaration’s insistence on political reforms, leaders should additionally apply more pressure to the PA to reconcile with other political factions, with an eye toward assembling a unified, representative leadership for both Gaza and the West Bank.

Historic as this week’s UN gathering may be, the fanfare in New York cannot mask the failures and half-measures that have brought the conflict to today’s terrible juncture. The Palestinian entity that leaders have recognised is, in reality, a shredded patchwork of lands encaged by an Israeli state that is destroying Palestinian collective life. For whatever moral value that recognition carries, many Palestinians fear they are once again the victims of symbolic politics devoid of material heft. The price is the withering of a Palestinian society that is now sifting through the rubble of an even more fragmented homeland. It is insufficient to recognise a “state” that is rapidly disappearing before the world’s eyes.