Israeli Ground Incursion Raises Spectre of Israel-Lebanon Clash

An Israeli ground raid in southern Lebanon has increased fears of a direct clash between the two countries’ armies, even as a shaky ceasefire remains in place. Early on Thursday 30 October, Israeli troops entered the border town of Blida and fired on the municipality building, killing a civilian inside. It later claimed its soldiers had encountered a threat. The incident triggered a wave of public anger in Lebanon, which culminated in Lebanese President Joseph Aoun instructing the army to confront future Israeli ground incursions with force.

Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon have persisted even in the aftermath of the truce that Israel and Lebanon struck last November. Though intended to end the latest disastrous war between Israel and Hizbollah, the powerful Lebanese Shiite militia-cum-party, the truce has not kept Israel from launching near-daily aerial strikes inside its northern neighbour’s borders and occupying several positions in Lebanon’s south. Israel claims its operations are countering efforts by Hizbollah to rebuild its military capacity, in violation of the ceasefire’s terms.

Aoun’s instructions would nevertheless alter the status quo by ending Lebanon’s policy of avoiding direct armed confrontation with Israel. Lebanon’s military did not intervene during the Israel-Hizbollah war, even as Israeli attacks killed dozens of Lebanese soldiers. Beirut explained that Lebanon had never approved Hizbollah’s entry into a war with Israel, but clearly also wanted to avoid sending the nation’s soldiers into a pitched battle against Israel’s much stronger military.

Operations like Thursday’s put Lebanese leaders in a difficult position. Already, they face criticism for failing to prevent Israeli attacks. Chief among their detractors is Hizbollah, which claims that the government is letting the country down, and constantly exhorts it to respond more forcefully. It is not clear whether Aoun will stand behind his pledge to confront future incursions. But even if not, each one leaves Beirut with less room to manoeuvre away from a perilous choice – sending the army into a disastrous conflict or holding back and undermining the military’s credibility.

Nobody benefits more from this conundrum than Hizbollah. Although it approved the ceasefire deal (while disputing the extent of the requirement that it disarm), the group maintains that the Lebanese state must defend the nation effectively and needs support from Hizbollah’s military wing to do so. That argument could resonate more strongly, especially among Hizbollah supporters, if the army shies away from the battlefield in the face of Israeli attacks, or if it fights and is routed.

These scenarios are also awkward for the United States. Beyond leading international efforts to keep the ceasefire in place, Washington is both Israel’s principal ally and the Lebanese army’s key sponsor. For decades, the U.S. has invested in boosting Lebanon’s military to be a counterweight to Hizbollah. Yet as U.S. envoy Tom Barrack recently observed, Washington does not “want to arm them so they can fight Israel”. Unless the Trump administration pressures Israel to scale back its operations in Lebanon, it might soon see one or both of those objectives undermined.